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EXIT POLLS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although the major television networks have long projected pres-
idential election results before western states closed their polls,' NBC's
use of exit polls to project the outcome of the i98o race at 8:15 p.m.,
2
a full two hours before many western states closed their polls, has
brought election-night projections under fierce attack. Many critics
argue that such projections, especially the earlier and more accurate
projections made possible by exit polls, discourage voting because
people see no reason to vote once the presidential race appears to
have been decided. 3 According to these critics, election-night projec-
tions devalue the franchise of citizens living in western states. 4
These and other criticisms have inspired legislative proposals at
the state and federal levels. Since the I98O election, three states have
asserted that exit polling disrupts the voting process and have enacted
I See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH, TURNED-ON TV/TuRNED-OFF VOTERS 2I-25
(1983).
2 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 198o, at A32, col. 1. Unless otherwise noted, all times given in
this Note are Eastern Standard Time.
3 See, e.g., Jackson, Election Night Reporting and Voter Turnout, 27 AM. J. POL. Sci. 615,
629 (1983) (arguing that knowledge of the outcome is "an important influence on whether people
vote"); Election Day Practices and Election Projection: Hearings Before the Task Force on
Elections of the Comm. on House Admin. and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 9 7th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 117-22 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings] (statement of Prof. Jackson); Early
Election Returns and Projections Affecting the Electoral Process: Hearings Before the Comm.
on House Admin. and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., rst Sess. 30-O3 (198i) [hereinafter
cited as ig8i Hearings] (statement of Prof. Appleton); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-671, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984) ("We do not know the precise size of the decline in voter turnout...
due to the early network projections .... But there is no doubt that there was a decline.").
Many eyewitness accounts confirm that at least some would-be voters turned away from the
polls when they heard the media's predictions. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE U.S.
& COMM. FOR STUDIES OF THE AM. ELECTORATE, REPORT ON 1982 NETWORK ELECTION
NIGHT PROJECTIONS: NON-VOTER STUDY 1983-84, reprinted in Broadcast Media in Elections:
Hearing Held Jointly Before the Task Force on Elections of the Comm. on House Admin. and
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (1983); ig8x Hearings, supra, at 115-16
(statement of March Fong Eu, California Secretary of State); id. at 175 (statement of B. Teri
Burns); id. at 217 (statement of Raymond A. Phelps).
One study, however, found no evidence that the early projections decreased voter turnout.
See Epstein & Strom, Election Night Projections and West Coast Turnout, 9 AM. POL. Q. 479,
486, 489 (298i). Other observers have described the problem as minor. See, e.g., 1981 Hearings,
supra, at 157 (statement of Prof. Tannenbaum).
4 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-671, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984) (stating that projections
convinced some voters that "their votes did not count"); Comment, Restricting the Broadcast
of Election-Day Projections: A Justifiable Protection of the Right to Vote, 9 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 297, 308 (1984) (contending that projections cause a "constructive denial" of the franchise);
Editorial, Protecting the Polls, Both Kinds, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at A26, col. i (observing
that by allowing early projections society treats some Votes as "irrelevant").
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laws prohibiting exit polls within three hundred feet of voting areas.5
Many other states are considering similar restrictions. 6 At the federal
level, similar concerns have prompted various congressional proposals,
including one that would require networks to delay election-night
predictions 7 and another that would establish a uniform poll-closing
time prior to which the networks would voluntarily withhold exit poll
results.8
This Note examines the constitutionality and the wisdom of these
state laws and congressional proposals. Part I traces the history of
exit polls and election-night projections. Part H argues that restric-
tions on the collection or dissemination of exit poll data, whether
designed to prevent disruption at the voting area or to protect the
integrity of the vote, violate the first amendment. Part III concludes
that a uniform poll-closing time coupled with voluntary network re-
straint would both allay legitimate concerns about election-night pre-
dictions and comport with first amendment values.
I. THE HISTORY OF ELECTION-NIGHT PROJECTIONS
The charge that election-night projections deter voting is not new.
In 196o, the television networks began using actual returns to predict
the outcomes of presidential races. 9 On election day at 7:15 p.m.,
CBS projected a decisive victory for Richard Nixon; by 8 p.m., it
had reversed itself, predicting a narrow victory for John Kennedy. 10
The predictions apparently did not discourage voting in western
states.' On the evening of Lyndon Johnson's 1964 landslide victory,
CBS projected Johnson to be the winner at 9:04 p.m., again using
actual returns. 12 This early projection prompted concern that some
people in western states, where polls remained open for at least an
hour after the announcement of Johnson's victory, had not bothered
to vote. Most studies, however, found "no evidence" that early pro-
5 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.36 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 29.51.02O(I)(e) (West Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22-26-113 (Michie Supp. 1984).
6 See Calmes, Method Sought to Restrict Broadcast Vote Predictions, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 565, 566 (1984) (reporting that 26 states have enacted or are considering such restrictions).
The exit polling controversy has also inspired private efforts to boycott or deceive pollsters.
See, e.g., Royko, Make My Day; Tell a Little Lie, Chicago Trib., Mar. 15, 1984, § I, at 3,
col. I.
7 See, e.g., S. 762, 9 7th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Rzc. S2483 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1981).
8 See, e.g., H.R. 3557, 97th Cong., ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H267 (daily ed. May 12,
198I).
9 See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH, supra note I, at 20-21; T. WHITE, THE MAKING
OF THE PRESIDENT: 1960, at 12-14 (1961).
10 See T. WHITE, supra note 9, at 12-13.
11 See Note, Elections, Computers and the First Amendment, 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
17, 25 (1966).
12 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1964, at 34, col. 2.
1928 [VOL. 98:1927
jections had affected the vote. 13 The 1968 presidential election was
too close to call before polls closed in the West. 14 In the landslide
1972 presidential election, however, early projections may have caused
a 2.7% decline in voter turnout in western states.' 5
The i98o election marked the first use of exit polls to predict the
outcome of a presidential race.16 On the basis of exit poll data, NBC
predicted Ronald Reagan's victory at 8:15 p.m., 17 when the polls were
open in at least twenty-three states.' 8 When President Carter made
his concession speech at 9:50 p.m., people were still able to vote in
several states. 19 These events ignited a furor over exit polling and
media predictions generally. Although Carter's speech may have in-
fluenced turnout as much as early network projections did,20 most
studies have indicated that the projections caused a perceptible decline
in voter turnout in California and other western states. 2' Many Dem-
ocrats claim that the predictions and the concession speech discour-
13 See, e.g., K. Lang & G. Lang, Ballots and Broadcasts: The Impact of Expectations and
Election Day Perceptions on Voting Behavior (paper presented at the x965 Annual Conference
of the American Ass'n for Public Opinion Research (May 14, 1965)), reprinted in Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 9oth Cong., ist
Sess. 238, 244 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings]; Mendelsohn, Election-Day Broadcasts
and Terminal Voting Decisions, 30 PUB. OPINION Q. 212, 224 (1966); Miller, Analysis of the
Effect of Election Night Predictions on Voting Behavior, reprinted in 1967 Hearings, supra, at
211, 215. Although 2% of the electorate may have shifted from Johnson to Goldwater, 2%
apparently switched from Goldwater to Johnson; the overall effect was a wash. See Mendelsohn,
supyra, at 220-21. One survey indicated that the predictions may have influenced the choice of
i% of Oregon voters, but not the size of the turnout. See N.Y. Times, Nov. Io, 1964, at 28,
col. 4.
14 See Tuchman & Coffin, The Influence of Election Night Television Broadcasts in a Close
Election, 35 PUB. OPINION Q. 315, 318 (1971). By the time polls had closed in California, two
of the three networks showed Nixon with lO5 electoral votes, Humphrey with 93, and Wallace
with 32. See id. These projections reportedly had "no discernible effects" on voting. Id. at
325.
Is See Wolfinger & Linquiti, Tuning In and Turning Out, PUB. OPINION, Feb.-Mar. i98I,
at 56, 57-58.
16 See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KosTmicH, supra note I, at 37. CBS privately tested exit poll
predictions in 1967 and has used exit poll data for political research ever since. NBC joined in
the practice in 1974. See id.
17 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, i98O, at A3 2, col. i.
18 See Comment, supra note 4, at 298.
19 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 198o, at A3 2, col. I. Using actual returns, ABC predicted the
outcome of the race at 9:52 p.m., just after Carter had begun his speech. See id. CBS did not
project the winner until 10:32 p.m. See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KoSTRICH, supra note i, at 25.
Well before their formal pronouncements, however, all three networks had implied that Reagan
would win. See id. at 25, 33.
NBC and ABC could have called the race as early as noon on election day, but they withheld
their predictions, possibly to avoid public criticism. See z98z Hearings, supra note 3, at 59
(statement of Dr. Austin Ranney).
20 See 1982 Hearings, supra note 3, at 164 (Report of the Task Force on Elections to the
Comm. on House Admin.); Jackson, supra note 3, at 624.
21 See sources cited supra note 3.
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aged Democratic turnout more than they discouraged Republican turn-
out and cost the Democrats at least two congressional seats.
22
Other recent events have fueled criticism of exit polls. In 1984,
using what could be termed an "entrance poll," CBS projected that
Walter Mondale would win the Iowa Democratic caucuses. CBS
broadcast its projection at 8:12 p.m., before the first actual caucus
vote, which could not legally occur before 8:30 p.m. 23 A congressional
subcommittee reacted to the Iowa caucus projection by chastizing the
media at a hearing on the eve of the New Hampshire primary; two
of the major networks responded by promising not to project winners
before all of the polls in New Hampshire closed. 24 During the 1984
presidential election, however, all three networks nationally broadcast
their projections that President Reagan would be the winner well
before western polls had closed, 25 although they did refrain from
broadcasting exit poll results from a particular state until that state's
polls had closed.
26
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIONS
ON THE COLLECTION OR DISSEMINATION OF EXIT POLL DATA
State and federal restrictions on the collection or dissemination of
exit poll data may impinge upon first amendment rights under either
of two theories. First, laws that exclude pollsters from the voting
area infringe on an aspect of freedom of the press - the media's right
to gather news. 27 Although courts have not guaranteed the press any
special right of access to governmental buildings or proceedings, they
22 See z981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 217 (statement of Raymond A. Phelps); Calmes, supra
note 6, at 565; Wicker, Notes on the Election, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, xg8o, at Ex9, col. i. But
see Epstein & Strom, supra note 3, at 485-86 (contending that there is no evidence that
projections hurt two Democrats who lost by narrow margins). It is not clear that the 198o
election predictions deterred more Democrats than Republicans from voting; indeed, one study
suggests just the opposite, although its statistical support is inconclusive. See Jackson, supra
note 3, at 630 ("Hearing the projections, or Carter's speech, or both has the greatest impact on
the turnout of Republicans and the least effect on Independents.").
23 See Early Election Projection: The Iowa Experience: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-80, 85 (1984) (statement of Dave Nagle, Iowa Democratic
Party Chairman).
24 See id. at 125-46 (committee's criticisms); id. at 143 (NBC's pledge); id. at 144 (ABC's
pledge).
25 See Wash. Post, fan. 18, 2985, at Ax, col. 4.
26 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1985, at Ai, col. x.
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ...
of the press."). The courts have consistently recognized a first amendment right to gather news.
See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("[W]ithout some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."); In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d
807, 808 (5th Cir. 1982) (government can promulgate only narrow restrictions on post-verdict
[Vol. 98:19271930
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have denied the media access only to places already off-limits to the
general public. 28 Because state election laws generally allow the pub-
lic access to areas outside of election halls, 29 the media must be
allowed the same access, and restrictions on media activity within
such areas must be subjected to first amendment scrutiny. Second,
laws that restrict the collection or dissemination of exit poll data
infringe on the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. Not
only is the dissemination of exit poll results a form of speech, but exit
polling itself involves discussions between willing participants on the
political issues of the day.
Judicial review of restrictions on the collection or dissemination of
exit poll data may proceed along either of two lines of first amendment
analysis, depending on the purpose of the restriction. Statutes in-
tended to address noncommunicative adverse effects of exit polls -
interviews with jurors); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (same);
Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 15o5,
1533 (1974) ("[Nlewsgathering from a willing source is a constitutionally protected right .... ").
But cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. i, 17 (1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather information.").
The collection of exit poll data for public dissemination is a form of newsgathering and
should thus receive first amendment protection. The charge that the networks merely manu-
facture this information for profit, see Brief of Appellees at 39-4o, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro,
747 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1984), modified, Nos. 84-4005, 84-4063 (Apr. 2, 1985), even if true,
would not lessen first amendment protection for exit polling. The cases limiting first amendment
protection for corporate speech have not involved anything resembling a news organization's
efforts to gather and report information, but have instead focused on corporations' efforts to
sell their product or service. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv..
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (i98o) (diminished protection for advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (diminished protection for lawyers' solicitation of
clients because it is commercial speech). Furthermore, cases involving the media suggest that
broadcasters are not likely to receive less protection for their newsgathering activities merely
because they publish for profit. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (I973) ("If ... profit motive were determinative, all aspects of [a
newspaper's] operations . . . would be subject to regulation . . . ."); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Dally Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251,
1259-6o (9 th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), modified, Nos.
84-4005, 84-4o63 (Apr. 2, 1985).
28 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. I, 6 (1978).
29 See, e.g., Daily Herald, 747 F.2d at 1259 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (Washington statute allows public and press access). State laws may make narrow
exceptions for electioneering, see, e.g., Piper v. Swan, 319 F. Supp. 908, 9IO-li (E.D. Tenn.
1970) (upholding ban on electioneering within ioo feet of polls), petition for writ of mandamus
denied, 401 U.S. 971 (1971), and they may prohibit all activity except voting within a very
small radius of the polls, typically 5o feet, see, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, ioi
Ariz. 265, 419 P.2d 49 (1966) (5o-foot zone); Feld v. Prewitt, 274 Ky. 306, 118 S.W.2d 700
(1938) (same); see also Brief of Appellees at 31, Daily Herald (Nos. 84-4005, 84-4o63) (media
concede that a law excluding all but voters and election workers from the polling building would
be constitutional).
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such as their alleged tendency to disrupt order and decorum at voting
places - are held to a relaxed standard of judicial review. In con-
trast, statutes designed to address the communicative impact of exit
polls - the broadcast of exit poll data and its alleged effect on voter
turnout - receive heightened judicial scrutiny.30 This Part considers
whether the two types of restriction on exit polls violate the first
amendment.31
A. Preserving Order and Decorum in the Voting Area
The constitutionality of state restrictions on exit pollsters' contact
with voters is an issue few courts have yet confronted. 32 The major
networks and two newspapers have challenged a Washington statute
of this type; the case is still pending. 33 States generally justify restric-
tions on exit polling as means of preventing disruption at election
halls.3 4 Even if a court accepts this justification as the true legislative
purpose, 35 the restriction must nonetheless satisfy a variety of first
amendment requirements. Assuming the restrictions are not designed
30 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 582 (978). Compare United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (i968) (applying relaxed scrutiny to a statute whose
purpose was unrelated to the suppression of expression), with Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 98-99 (972) (stricter scrutiny for content-based restrictions on expression), and First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 795 (1978) (requiring a state to show a "compelling" interest
to justify for its prohibition of corporate expenditures to influence referenda).
31 State exit poll restrictions might also violate the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. Because Congress has regulated all phases of television communications, it retains
plenary power to regulate broadcasting "exclusive of State action." Allen B. Dumont Labora-
tories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 55 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951); see also
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694, 2701, 2703 (1984) (federal preemption of
regulation of cable television advertising). By effectively preventing the broadcast of exit poll
results, state restrictions would conflict with federal broadcast regulations, which currently allow
the broadcast of election-night projections, and would thus violate the commerce clause. None-
theless, courts have generally not applied commerce clause analysis to other state restrictions
that similarly inhibit interstate broadcasts, such as limitations on media access to court pro-
ceedings; they have instead limited their analysis to first amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Houch-
ins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. i, i6 (1978) (applying first amendment analysis to restrictions on
media access to county jail).
32 Two state attorneys general have declined to interpret electioneering laws to include exit
polling, noting that such an interpretation would implicate first amendment concerns. See
Opinion of the Att'y Gen., No. 82-2-i (Iowa, Feb. 3, 1982) (available on LEXIS, States library,
Iowa file); i98o-i98i Op. Att'y Gen. 65 (La Oct. 8, 198o).
33 See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1984), modified, Nos. 84-4005,
84-4063 (Apr. 2, 1985). The two-judge majority in Daily Herald declined to reach the first
amendment issue, remanding the case for trial of factual issues. These issues include the precise
definition of an exit poll, the nature of media disruptions at polling places, whether exit polls
can be conducted outside a 3oo-foot radius, and the state's motives in enacting the law. See
id. at 1252-53.
34 See, e.g., Brief of Appellees at 28, Daily Herald (Nos. 84-4005, 84-4o63).
35 The disruption rationale, however, may often mask a state's intent to suppress dissemi-
nation of poll results. See infra pp. 1938-39.
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to address the communicative impact of exit polls, the state must
show that, on balance, they are reasonable 36 and not overbroad.
3 7 If
the area around the voting place is deemed a public or quasi-public
forum, however, a heightened standard of scrutiny applies.
3 8
States do have legitimate interests that might be served by restric-
tions on exit polling. The right to vote, enshrined in the Constitu-
tion,3 9 is fundamental, 40 and states have an interest in protecting this
right by providing voting places that are safe and accessible. 4 1 Exit
polling is a complicated process that may interfere with voting. Re-
porters conducting an exit poll usually stand at selected voting places
during the entire period that people are voting, handing "question-
naires" to a random sample of people who have just voted. To fill
out the questionnaires, voters sometimes use chairs, tables, and other
facilities provided at the election hall. It takes voters three to four
minutes to complete the survey, which may closely resemble a ballot.
4 2
This process may generate a crowd of voters filling out forms and
cause prospective voters to turn away thinking that voting booths are
crowded. 43 In addition, pollsters may annoy voters who do not wish
to be interviewed, discouraging them from returning to vote in the
next election. 44 Exit polling may also confuse some voters, especially
recently naturalized or illiterate citizens. They may mistake the ques-
tionnaire for an actual ballot and thereby neglect to vote, or they may
mistake pollsters for government overseers checking on how people
vote.45 Finally, the noise, crowds, and confusion caused by an exit
36 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (I968); L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-
2o, at 683.
37 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (observing that a statute is overbroad
if it "sweeps within its ambit" activities entitled to first amendment protection).
38 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-78 (1983).
39 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I (providing that the House of Representatives be chosen
"by the People"); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (electoral college); id. art. I, § 4, cl. i (providing for
regulation of time, place, and manner of holding elections); id. amend. XV ("The right of
citizens ... to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."); id. amend. XVII (popular election of senators); id. amend. XIX
(women's suffrage); id. amend. XXIV (prohibition of poll taxes); id. amend. XXVI (voting age).
40 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665, 670 (I966); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
41 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659,
66o-6i, 665 (5th Cir. 1967) (setting aside state election and ordering a special election where
election officials segregated voting lists and booths and where the police "allowed a large crowd
of white males to gather near the polls thus intimidating Negroes from voting"); cf. NLRB v.
Carroll Contracting & Ready-Mix, Inc., 636 F.2d III, 113 (5 th Cir. Feb. 198I) (Unit B) (setting
aside union election because of electioneering).
42 See Brief of Appellees at 13, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1984),
modified, Nos. 84-4005, 84-4063 (Apr. 2, 1985).
43 See id. at 34.
44 See id.
4S See id. at 48-49.
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poll might disturb election workers who must manage voting booths
and registration lists.
Under minimal first amendment scrutiny, the state's interest in
facilitating orderly voting through a particular restriction must out-
weigh the restriction's infringement on the media's first amendment
rights. 46 This infringement is substantial because state restrictions
may severely hamper the collection, and ultimately the dissemination,
of reliable exit poll data. In the absence of restrictions, pollsters
stationed near the exits at an election hall can take a random sample
of all who actually vote. The establishment of restricted zones in
which exit polling is forbidden may prevent pollsters from questioning
voters who leave by car or public transportation, as well as voters
who walk off without passing the interviewers. 47 Thus, by decreasing
both the size and the randomness 48 of the sample of voters inter-
viewed, restricted zones reduce the accuracy of exit polls. 49 Most
important, pollsters stationed at a distance from the voting booths can
no longer be sure that each passing person has actually voted. This
uncertainty further reduces the accuracy of exit polls, 50 which are
There is anecdotal evidence to support all of these contentions. The primary sponsor of the
Washington bill claimed to have received "many calls" from voters, some of whom were "rather
confused," and the majority of whom "resented the [exit poll] process and felt intimidated and
felt that there was an invasion of their privacy." Id. at 20 (quoting transcript attached to
Affidavit of Don Whiting, at 1-2). Other officials have cited similar complaints. See Daily
Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing journalist conducting an exit poll "right next to the ballot box"),
modified, Nos. 84-4005, 84-4o63 (Apr. 2, 1985). The State of Washington intends "to fully
establish at trial the disruptive effect" of exit polling. Brief of Appellees at 12, Daily Herald
(Nos. 84-4005, 85-4o63).
46 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); L. TRIBE, supra note 30,
§ 12-2, at 582.
47 See Daily Herald, 747 F.2d at 1257-58 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Brief of Appellants at 17, 22, Daily Herald (Nos. 84-4005, 84-4o63); Abrams, Press
Practices, Polling Restrictions, Public Opinion and First Amendment Guarantees, 49 PUB.
OPINION Q. I5, 16 (1985); cf. P. TANNENBAUM & L. KoSTRICH, supra note i, at 136-37 (stating
that a 5oo- to 15oo-foot ban would effectively prevent exit polling). But see Levy, The Meth-
odology and Performance of Election Day Polls, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 54, 65-66 (1983) (reporting
that Florida's 3oo-foot ban apparently "did not hamper the ABC poll" in i98o); Comment, supra
note 4, at 311 n.95 (suggesting that Florida's 3oo-foot ban might "make exit polling more difficult
without eliminating the practice").
48 Restricted zones decrease the randomness of the sample because pollsters can question
only those voters who happen to leave in a certain direction, making it more difficult to obtain
a true cross-section of the actual voting population. See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH,
supra note i, at 137.
49 See Daily Herald, 747 F.2d at 1257-58 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); cf. Levy, supra note 47, at 66-67 (observing that vast sample size is one of exit polling's
great strengths). Although the media could ameliorate some of these problems by stationing
more pollsters at the perimeter of the immunized zone, this accommodation would entail much
higher, possibly prohibitive, costs. See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KoSTRICH, supra note i, at 137.
50 See Daily Herald, 747 F.2d at 1258 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Affidavit of Adam Clymer, Assistant to the Executive Editor of the New York Times,
unique because "'they involve interviews with people who have ac-
tually voted, not people who say they will vote, who pollsters expect
to vote or who say they have voted."'
5 1
The first amendment interests at stake have additional importance
because exit polls generate important research data that cannot be
obtained in any other way. No other polling method can so accurately
measure what people are thinking at the moment they vote.5 2 In
addition, exit polls provide unique data on the socio-economic com-
position of the voting population. Media and academic experts use
the poll information to study voting behavior, political trends, and
the influence of current events on voters' choices. 53 The state laws
seem unreasonably restrictive because they effectively prevent the use
of exit polls not only for election-night projections but also for long-
term research.
Moreover, courts assessing the reasonableness of a restriction on
exit polling should not ignore the availability of much narrower mea-
sures to reduce disruption even if states are not necessarily obligated
to employ the least restrictive alternative. States could require poll-
sters to explain to voters that they may refuse to be interviewed and
that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. Inter-
viewers could be required to wear distinctive clothing, as they often
do now, that would show they are not government officials. To reduce
noise and confusion, states could exclude pollsters from the area im-
mediately around the voting booths or even from the election hall.
These measures, together with a general prohibition of disruptive
behavior, would eliminate disorder where the voting actually takes
place. The only governmental interest in prohibiting polling far away
para. 15 [hereinafter cited as Clymer Affidavit]); P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH, supra note
I, at 137; Levy, supra note 47, at 66-67 (noting that the "virtually coincidental nature of the
interviewing" enhances the reliability of exit polls).
51 Daily Herald, 747 F.2d at 1258 (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Clymer Affidavit, supra note 5o, para. 15). Most pre- and post-election surveys are
less reliable because it is uncertain whether the entire sample has actually voted. See Busch &
Lieske, Does Time of Voting Affect Exit Poll Results?, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 94, 104 (1985).
52 Telephone polls, based on government records of who voted, are also less accurate because
at a remote time and place more people tend to misreport their personal characteristics and
views, as well as their voting choices. See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KoSTRICH, supra note I, at
138 (observing that in post-election telephone surveys, voters are more likely to "refuse to
cooperate" with pollsters, to be "forgetful," or to be "deliberately deceptive"); Busch & Lieske,
supra note 51, at 104 n.13. "The essence of exit polls is that you catch respondents fresh from
their voting experience and that you can use realistic sample ballots that should more readily
represent their actual behavior a minute or two earlier." P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH,
supra note i, at 138.
s3 Two examples of studies that incorporate exit poll data are Ladd, On Mandates, Realign-
inents, and the 1984 Presidential Election, Ioo POL. ScI. Q. I, 12-17, 20-22 (1985), and Ladd,
The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 198o Presidential Election, 96 POL. SCI.
Q. I, 11-2o (1981). Other studies are cited in Brief of Appellants at 14-16, Daily Herald (Nos.
84-4005, 84-4o63).
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from the voting booths would be to prevent harassment and confusion
of citizens generally, concerns that would never justify a ban on any
other opinion poll.
5 4
I State restrictions on exit polls are also facially overbroad because
they prohibit all exit polling within a specified zone, whether or not
it is disruptive. Long before state election statutes were amended to
restrict exit polls, most such statutes outlawed disruptive behavior
around the polls.55 The State of Washington acknowledges that prior
to amendment its election law would have prohibited exit polling
insofar as it actually interfered with voting, but the state contends
that the new statute merely "clarifie[s]" that all exit polling inherently
disrupts voting.56 If this claim were true, the statute's exit poll pro-
visions would be merely redundant. But there is no evidence that all,
or even many, exit pollsters have disrupted the voting process. The
disturbances that have occurred have usually involved polls taken
inside the election hall or in the area just outside the building rather
than polls conducted at any distance from the voting area.
5 7
If the election hall or the area surrounding it is deemed a public
or quasi-public forum, an exit poll restriction must undergo heightened
judicial scrutiny. Under such scrutiny, the state must demonstrate
that the restriction serves a substantial governmental interest.5 8 Here
the relevant speech interest is not in the dissemination of exit poll
54 There appear to be no cases challenging laws that restrict telephone polls and other public
opinion surveys. It is highly unlikely, however, that a court would uphold a law that generally
restricted political polltaking if the only state interest behind such a law was in preventing
possible annoyance to citizens. Even when a statute would serve a state's important interest in
ensuring fair elections, the Supreme Court has granted full constitutional protection to speech
about public affairs and elections. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978)
(holding that a statute prohibiting corporations from making expenditures to influence a refer-
endum violated the first amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. x, 51 (1976) (per curiam)
(holding that a limitation on independent campaign expenditures violated the first amendment).
55 See, e.g., Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251, 126o (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Washington election laws already prohibited disruption
before enactment of exit polling restriction), modified, Nos. 84-4005, 84-4063 (Apr. 2, x985).
56 Brief of Appellees at 2o n.12, Daily Herald (Nos. 84-4005, 84-4063).
57 See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 9 n.4, Daily Herald (Nos. 84-4o05, 84-4o63) (supporters
of Washington's law cited only instances of disruption inside polling places); cf. P. TANNENBAUM
& L. KoSTRuCH, supra note i, at 140 (suggesting that 5oo-foot zone would be much larger than
necessary to ensure order). Before the states established restricted zones, most pollsters con-
ducted surveys just outside the election hall exits; hence it is unsurprising that there is little
information on whether more distant poll-taking would ever disrupt voting. Nonetheless, states
shoulder the burden of demonstrating a need for laws that infringe on first amendment rights.
See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d io59, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that "the
Government has the burden of establishing . . . that the incidental infringement" is tolerable).
The State of Washington has implied that a complete ban on all activity within a sizeable
zone would also be constitutional. See Brief of Appellees at 32, Daily Herald (Nos. 84-4005,
84-4o63). Such an approach, however, would be even more overbroad, for it would ban all
nondisruptive activity outside the voting place, not just peaceful exit polling. Some states do
prohibit all activity, but only within a much smaller radius. See supra note 29.
58 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-78 (1983).
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results, but in the collection of exit poll data outside election halls.5 9
The courts have constructed a hierarchy of fora at which the govern-
ment may restrict expressive activity.60 In public places that have
traditionally facilitated verbal and physical communication, such as
sidewalks and parks, the Constitution tolerates only the narrowest
restrictions on expression, even if speakers can find alternative means
to communicate their message. 61 In governmental facilities not de-
signed for public communication, such as hospitals, jails, and military
bases, the state has greater power to restrict peaceful expressive ac-
tivity in order to prevent interference with government business. 62 In
quasi-public fora such as schools and libraries, which promote only
particular kinds of expression, "[t]he crucial question is whether the
manner of expression [that is restricted] is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."
' 63
The restricted zones established by existing state statutes cover
both public and quasi-public fora. An election hall itself probably
would not qualify as a full-fledged public forum because its primary
purpose is not to facilitate unfettered physical or verbal communica-
tion. Still, like a school or library, it promotes a certain kind of
expression - voting - and thus qualifies as a quasi-public forum.
The grounds surrounding the election hall, like the grounds of a school
or library, should be deemed a quasi-public forum as well. 64 In
addition, the sidewalks, streets, and parks surrounding the election
hall are public fora and should not lose that status on election day,
any more than the sidewalks outside the Supreme Court building lose
their public forum status during Court sessions.
65
A court might decline to draw such fine lines in assessing a re-
stricted zone and might instead treat an entire voting area as a public
or quasi-public forum. Under the standard of review for either type
of forum, however, restricted zones would be found unconstitutional.
If a court treated the area as a quasi-public forum, a ban on exit
polling could be justified only if the polling was found "incompatible"
with the activity of voting. Yet nondisruptive exit polling, either
within or outside the election hall, is not "incompatible" with voting.
A statute that banned only disruptive polling might survive under the
"incompatibility" standard, but existing statutes define all polls as per
59 See supra pp. 1930-32.
60 See Grace, 461 U.S. at 176-78.
61 See id. at 177.
62 See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836-39 (1976) (military base); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 827-28, 830 (1974) (jail cell).
63 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 1I6 (1972).
64 Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 & n.6 (1969)
(holding that the right of free speech is protected on school grounds outside of classrooms if the
speech does not lead to substantial interference with the operation of the school and noting that
school grounds are public property).
65 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1983) (sidewalks outside the Supreme
Court building are public fora).
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se disruptive, ignoring the likelihood that most polls would not inter-
fere with voting. Indeed, the presence of reporters near the polls and
the exit poll results themselves may provide safeguards against gov-
ernment impropriety in collecting and counting ballots. 66 Exit polling
may thus help to promote the state's interest in guaranteeing honest
elections. 67 If a court found that a voting place constituted a public
forum, a law establishing a restricted zone would be even more likely
to be found unconstitutional. Only the most narrow restrictions on
speech are permitted in public fora, 68 and disruptive exit polling could
be curbed by methods much more narrow than the establishment of
restricted zones. 69
Thus, even if merely designed to reduce disruption, statutes that
prohibit all exit polling in a sizeable zone surrounding election halls
violate the first amendment. Under the balancing test carried out
under minimal scrutiny, the state interest in reducing disruption does
not outweigh the drastic abridgement of the media's first amendment
rights. Furthermore, the laws are overbroad because they ban all exit
pollsters, and not just disruptive ones, from the voting area. Finally,
by forbidding polltaking in quasi-public or public fora, the laws curtail
communication in places traditionally reserved for free interchange.
B. Suppressing the Dissemination of Exit Poll Data
Although states might conceivably enact statutes to regulate the
disruptive aspects of exit polling, there is good reason to believe that
the recently enacted state statutes are in fact designed to serve another
purpose - specifically, that they are intended to suppress the dissem-
66 The possibility of government fraud is greater than the possibility that the media might
fabricate poll data to influence elections or to cast doubt on official returns because several news
organizations now vie to gather exit poll data, whereas the government has a monopoly on the
tabulation of official returns. The major networks, the Associated Press, the New York Times,
and other newspapers have all taken exit surveys. See Brief of Appellants at 4, Daily Herald
Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d i25, (9th Cir. 1984), modified, Nos. 84-4005, 84-4063 (Apr. 2, 1985);
Levy, supra note 47, at 55 & n.2.
67 These safeguards distinguish regulation of the media from regulation of electioneering and
other campaign activity around the polls. Courts have upheld restrictions on campaigning
outside the polls partly because of the danger that it might coerce or frighten voters. See Piper
v. Swan, 319 F. Supp. 908, 9io-II (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (upholding ban on distribution of
campaign literature within Ioo feet of election building), petition for writ of mandamus denied,
401 U.S. 971 (1971); State v. Black, 54 N.J.L. 446, 452, 24 A. 489, 491 (1892) (same). But
this interest in the integrity of elections argues against similar bans on the press, which can
police the collection of ballots by watching the voting process, and which can check the
government's tabulation by comparing it with exit poll results. Moreover, unlike partisan
campaign workers, reporters generally do not attempt to influence voters' decisions; exit pollsters
speak with people only after they have voted. See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH, supra
note i, at 140.
68 See supra p. 1937.
69 See supra pp. 1935-36.
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ination of exit poll results. The passage of these measures coincides
with the recent concern that election-night broadcasts of exit poll
results discourage voting, and the statutes are poorly tailored for the
purpose of maintaining order at elections halls. The State of Wash-
ington, by arguing that preventing the broadcasting of exit poll results
justifies its new statute, has virtually admitted that the statute is in
fact designed to regulate the content of election-night broadcasts.
70
In view of the strong possibility that such laws are designed primarily
to prevent the dissemination of poll data, courts should not hesitate
to probe the motives underlying restrictions on exit polling. Although
the Supreme Court has in the past suggested that the investigation of
legislative motives should play only a limited role in determining the
constitutionality of an otherwise valid statute,
71 it has more recently
expressed a greater willingness to consider claims of illicit purpose.
72
If an examination of legislative purpose reveals an intent to prevent
the broadcasting of exit poll data, the state must at least show that
its regulation is "narrowly tailored to further a substantial govern-
mental interest," the standard for broadcast regulation enunciated in
FCC v. League of Women Voters. 73 Indeed, more exacting scrutiny
should be applied because existing state restrictions do not merely
regulate or delay broadcasting. Rather, they prevent the collection of
exit poll data, thereby preventing the data's use for any purpose,
whether or not it involves broadcasting. A court would thus be
unlikely to treat the state laws as broadcast regulations and would
instead apply the standard generally used for nonbroadcasting regu-
lations aimed at the communicative impact of speech. The laws would
be subject to the strictest level of scrutiny, which requires states to
demonstrate a "compelling" interest.
74
70 See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251, 1263 n.13 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that at oral argument the state relied on
this justification "in the alternative"), modified, Nos. 84-4005, 84-4063 (Apr. 2, 1985). The
American Legal Foundation argued the same point more directly in its amicus brief. See Brief
Amicus Curiae at 7, 31-33, Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, No. C8 3-84 oT (W.D. Wash. June 29,
1984), rev'd per curiam, 747 F.2d 1251 (9 th Cir. 1984), modified, Nos. 84-4005, 84-4o63 (Apr.
2, 1985).
71 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
72 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.n (1976) (observing that legislative intent
is relevant in an equal protection challenge and implying that motive is relevant in religion
cases and in "constitutional adjudication" generally); Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d
1251, 1253 (9 th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (reversing summary judgment order upholding state
restriction on exit polling because the state may have been "motivated by an intent to suppress"
protected expression), modified, Nos. 84-4005, 84-4063 (Apr. 2, 1985); see also L. TRIBE, supra
note 30, § 12-6, at 596-98 (arguing that courts should consider illicit legislative motive in first
amendment cases).
73 104 S. Ct. 31o6, 3118 (1984). The Supreme Court has generally applied stricter scrutiny
to regulation of print media. See infra note 83.
74 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (quoting Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (ig6o)); see also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[Albove all
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State restrictions are unlikely to further any important government
interest because they do little to protect the citizens of the enacting
state. Suppressing data from exit polls taken within the state will not
prevent voters from hearing the results of exit polls taken in other
states. 75 California voters complain not because the networks broad-
cast projections of results from California, but because the networks
predict the outcomes in eastern states first. Similarly, laws that sup-
press exit poll data from elections held in eastern states might benefit
western voters but could not be justified as a way of protecting turnout
in the eastern states themselves, because the networks no longer pre-
dict outcomes in a given state until its polls have closed. 76 Although
the Framers seem to have left the states free to pass altruistic legis-
lation, 7 7 conferring a benefit on nonresidents, over whom states have
no power, may not qualify as a "substantial" state interest. States
might argue, however, that altruism alone does not motivate their
restrictions because they indirectly reap benefits from similar laws
passed by other states. Although no state acting alone could halt early
projections based on exit polls, a collection of states acting together
might well succeed. 78
But even if restrictions enacted by several states were together
effective in preventing the broadcast of early projections, they would
still not further any compelling, or even substantial, state interest.
79
A congressional requirement that networks delay dissemination of exit
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." (citations omitted)).
75 See P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH, supra note i, at 199.
76 See N.Y. Times, Jan. i8, z985, at Ai, col. i.
77 Although the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, forbids a
state from discriminating against nonresidents without "substantial reason," see Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948), it probably does not prohibit states from enacting laws to
benefit outsiders.
78 Even if such interstate cooperation does not violate the first amendment, it arguably might
run afoul of the compact clause of the Constitution, which forbids states from making agreements
or contracts with one another without congressional approval. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
cl. 3. The Supreme Court has rejected a literal reading that would require congressional
authorization for all joint action and has upheld agreements that do not "impermissibly enhance
state power at the expense of federal supremacy." United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472 (1978); see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-70
(1976) (holding that a boundary agreement was not a compact because it did not encroach on
federal authority). A web of state exit polling bans might impermissibly encroach on federal
power to regulate interstate commerce, see supra note 31, and thereby resemble a compact.
It is doubtful, however, that the Court would treat the enactment of such laws as a compact
unless the states made explicit agreements, especially because the laws could ostensibly serve
purposes other than suppression of exit poll broadcasts. See supra p. 1932. Although the
compact clause reaches both formal agreements and "informal" compacts, see Multistate Tax,
434 U.S. at 47o-71, compacts have generally involved much more explicit expressions of state
assent, see, e.g., Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 435 n.x, 438 (i98i) (holding that an intricate
extradition agreement among 48 states and the District of Columbia was a compact).
79 See infra p. 1942.
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poll results would similarly fail to serve any substantial federal objec-
tive. The leading case on governmental efforts to restrict the media's
influence on voting behavior is Mills v. Alabama,8 0 in which the
Supreme Court held that a state's interest in protecting voters from
last-minute coercion did not warrant a ban on election-day newspaper
editorials.8 ' This holding implies that either a ban on or a mandated
delay of election-day projections would also violate the first amend-
ment. 82
A state or the federal government might attempt to distinguish
Mills by arguing that the standard of review applied there, while
appropriate for a case involving the print media, is more strict than
the substantial interest standard that should be applied in broadcasting
cases. 8 3 Yet the rationale behind the broadcasting standard - that
broadcast channels are scarce and therefore should be subject to
greater regulation in order to ensure a balanced presentation of views 84
- does not apply to regulation of election-night projections. The
government's concern is not that the networks broadcast biased pro-
jections, but that the networks' projections prove all too accurate.
Finally, there is no valid state or federal interest in a ban on or a
mandated delay of election-night predictions because the danger posed
by such projections does not differ from the danger that accompanies
similar speech protected from governmental regulation. Any poll,
indeed any political discourse, may discourage voting. Presidential
preference polls that for months showed Walter Mondale trailing Ron-
ald Reagan by a wide margin may have induced more apathy in the
1984 presidential election than did the networks' early prediction of
the actual 1984 vote. 85 It is unimaginable, however, that the courts
80 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
81 See id. at 218-19.
82 "[mlust as in Mills v. Alabama there was a danger in permitting election day editorials,
there is danger in permitting election day projections." Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d
1251, 1264 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), modified, Nos.
84-4005, 84-4o63 (Apr. 2, 1985).
83 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 31o6, 3118 (1984). Although the
majority opinion in Mills did not explicitly set forth the appropriate standard of review, sub-
sequent decisions have clarified that regulation of print media is subject to stricter scrutiny than
regulation of broadcasting. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring a newspaper to print replies), with Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-o (x969) (upholding a requirement that broadcasters
give reply time).
84 See League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3116.
85 See Dubois, Election Night Projections and Voter Turnout in the West: A Note on the
Hazards of Aggregate Data Analysis, ii Am. POL. Q. 349, 358 (1983) (arguing that public
opinion polls, not election-night projections, are most likely responsible for decline in turnout
in recent presidential elections); cf. Felton, Public Opinion Polls Play Key, But Also Misunder-
stood, Role in American Political Arena, 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 723, 725 (I98O) (contending
that pre-election polls may "directly affect the course of campaigns, even if they don't change
public opinion"). A 1968 Gallup poll showing Richard Nixon well ahead may have "irreparably
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would uphold a ban on pre-election polls or on any other kind of
political speculation. Furthermore, the evidence that election-night
projections always significantly discourage voting is inconclusive.8 6 In
a close election, early exit poll results may actually encourage voters
to participate by enhancing the perception that individual votes will
matter.
In sum, state laws that are designed to suppress the dissemination
of exit poll data violate the first amendment because they do not serve
a substantial, much less a compelling, state purpose. A federal law
requiring that networks delay election-night predictions would be more
narrowly tailored than would a state ban because it would allow the
eventual publication of election predictions and data on voting behav-
ior. Nonetheless, such a law would share the states' impermissible
objective - the suppression of projections - and would therefore fail
to serve a "substantial" 87 governmental interest. Any attempt to delay
or ban election-night projections would violate the first amendment.
III. UNIFORM POLL-CLOSING TIMES
Largely because of first amendment concerns, Congress has never
voted to ban the broadcast of election-night projections, although
individual legislators have proposed such measures. 88 Instead,
congressional committees have repeatedly called on the networks for
restraint; most notably, Congress passed a resolution in 1984 asking
the media to delay election-night projections. 89 By January 17, 1985,
the three major networks had promised Congress that they would
refrain from predicting election results in any state until that state's
polls had closed. 90 The pledges opened the way for a nationwide
damaged" the Humphrey campaign because it discouraged campaign contributions. See id.
Similarly, the polls "destroyed belief in any possibility" that George McGovern might defeat
Nixon in the 1972 election. See B. ALTSCHULER, KEEPING A FINGER ON THE PUBLIC PULSE:
PRIVATE POLLING AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 132-33 (1982).
86 See 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 157 (statement of Prof. Tannenbaum); Epstein &
Strom, supra note 3, at 486, 489.
87 League of Women Voters, 1o4 S. Ct. at 3118. Because a congressional statute would
expressly regulate the content of election-night broadcasts, a court would not have to decide
whether to probe legislative motive. See supra p. 1939 (arguing that courts should examine the
motivation behind state restrictions on exit polling).
88 See, e.g., S. 762, 9 7th Cong., ist Sess. (1981); S. 56, 87th Cong., ist Sess. (1961). These
bills rested on the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See Note, Reporting
Election Returns and Computer Predictions: Proposed Regulation, 50 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1189
& n.137 (1965). They all died in committee. Interestingly, Senator Goldwater, the sponsor of
the earliest such legislation, "now is unconvinced that those projections discourage voter turn-
out." Calmes, supra note 6, at 565.
89 See H.R. Con. Res. 321, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H6o23 (daily ed. June
i8, 1984).
90 See Letter from Roone Arledge, President of ABC, to Reps. Al Swift and William Thomas
(Dec. 12, 1984); Letter from Laurence Grossman, President of NBC News Division, to Reps.
Al Swift and William Thomas (Dec. 12, x984); Letter from Edward Joyce, President of CBS,
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uniform poll-closing time in presidential elections because they ensured
that the networks would not undermine a standard closing time by
broadcasting early exit poll results. 9 1
Uniform poll-closing legislation, however, faces many obstacles.
92
A serious logistical problem is that if polls are to close at ii:oo p.m.
in the East, then they must close at 5:00 p.m. in Hawaii, before many
people have finished work. Several solutions to this problem have
been proposed. One solution would move Election Day to Sunday,
93
but this alternative would conflict with religious observance. Another
option would impose the standard closing time only in the contiguous
forty-eight states; this solution, however, would have the obvious
infirmity of failing to extend the same protections to voters in Alaska
and Hawaii. A third proposal would extend daylight savings time for
two extra weeks in western states, decreasing the east-west time dif-
ference from three to two hours. 94 This proposal would alleviate the
problem but not solve it. Still another suggestion would require all
polls to remain open for a twenty-four-hour period, say from Monday
noon to Tuesday noon E.S.T. Under such a system, every voter in
the country would have the same selection of hours in which to vote.
The main drawback would be the added cost to the states of running
the elections, which would cost California alone an additional two
million dollars.95 The federal government could alleviate the financial
burden on the states by subsidizing the cost, but overnight elections
to Reps. Al Swift and William Thomas (Jan. 17, 1985) (all on file at Harvard Law School
Library); N.Y. Times, Jan. i8, 1985, at Ai, col. i.
91 See Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1985, at Ai, col. 4. The emergence of new networks may still
undermine efforts to secure restraint from the broadcast media. Although the Cable News
Network has thus far complied with congressional entreaties, see H.R. REp. No. 98-671, 9 8th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984), there is no guarantee that other, newer networks will follow suit.
Moreover, should newcomers begin broadcasting exit poll projections, no principle of contract
law can bind the television networks to their voluntary pledge to withhold exit poll data. Cf.
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.5, at 46-48 (1982) (gratuitous promises unenforceable). The
networks might nonetheless hesitate to repudiate their promise for fear of losing credibility and
political capital.
92 Some legislators doubt whether Congress has the constitutional authority to standardize
voting times. See Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1985, at Ai, col. 4. Their fears are probably unfounded.
Article I, § 4, cl. i of the Constitution provides that Congress may establish the "Times" of
federal elections. Congress has already wielded this power by establishing the first Tuesday in
November as Election Day. See 2 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
Leaders of the subcommittee estimate the chances that Congress will pass a uniform poll-
closing law at a little better than even. See Wash. Post, Jan. i8, 1985, at Ai, col. 4. The
House Subcommittee on Federal Elections, formerly the House Task Force on Elections, has
held hearings on the issue.
93 See H.R. 84, 9 7 th Cong., ist Sess. (i98I); Light, Effect of Media Projections on Pacific
Coast Voting Under Congressional Study, 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1437, 1438 (1981).
94 See 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 120-21 (statement of March Fong Eu, Secretary of
State of California).
95 See id. at ig.
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would still present security problems because state election officials
would have to guard the ballots already cast.96
Perhaps the most workable solution would make Election Day a
national holiday. The chief advantage of this alternative is that polls
in eastern states would not have to remain open late into the night,
because polls in western states could close in the late afternoon or
early evening, when people would otherwise be working. A second
benefit would be that the fanfare and free time created by a national
holiday might encourage voter turnout. Although critics charge that
this solution could indirectly cost the economy billions of dollars, 97
the cost could be reduced by making only the afternoon a holiday.
Furthermore, the holiday would be necessary only once every four
years, for presidential elections. There is no need for a nationwide
poll-closing time for midterm elections because the results of eastern
congressional races probably do not deter westerners from voting in
local elections.
Proposals for a uniform poll-closing time do not violate the media's
first amendment rights because they all rest on voluntary cooperation
by the networks. It might be argued that the government offends
first amendment values when it acts in concert with the media to
deny people access to certain information when they vote. After all,
Americans, unlike citizens of some other nations, have the right to
choose not to vote; their right to exercise this choice may include the
right to decide whether to listen to early reports on an election.
Nonetheless, if the media agree to withhold predictions, there would
be no willing speaker, and therefore no right to hear. 98 Congress
should therefore feel no doubt about the constitutionality of legislation
establishing a uniform poll-closing time; indeed, it should pass such
legislation promptly. 99
96 See id.; Light, supra note 93, at 1438.
97 See, e.g., P. TANNENBAUM & L. KOSTRICH, supra note i, at I 19.
98 See L. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-19, at 675 (observing that the right to know may at
times simply be a listener's right that government not suppress willing speakers); cf. Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (holding that there is a right to receive mail from
willing senders).
99 If Congress passed such legislation, its drawbacks might spur states to impose direct
controls on exit polls. A poll-closing law that inconvenienced voters, truncated western voting
times, entailed exorbitant costs, or exempted Alaska and Hawaii might not satisfy many western
states. This possibility alone might convince states that uniform poll-closing and media self-
restraint are insufficient.
If courts fail to strike down state restrictions on exit polling, Congress should consider
passing a measure that would require states to allow exit polling outside election halls, for
otherwise states will thwart the federal policy of standard poll closings coupled with voluntary
media restraint. Authority for such a law might rest on congressional power to regulate the
"Times, Places and Manner" of federal elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I. It is not
certain that this power includes the power to regulate activity around the voting area, but the




This Note has shown that both state restrictions on exit polling
and the proposed federal delay of election-night returns would violate
the first amendment. To achieve the legitimate governmental goals
that motivate these proposals, Congress should instead establish a
nationwide uniform poll-closing time and make all or part of Election
Day a national holiday in order to accommodate voters in western
states. These measures would insulate west coast voters from early
election news without infringing the media's right to gather and broad-
cast exit poll data.
The Constitution requires that the media shoulder the ultimate
responsibility for safeguarding west coast voters from early projec-
tions. After years of indifference, the media finally appear ready to
take that responsibility seriously. The networks' pledge to withhold
exit poll data until a state has closed all of its polls represents an
important step toward resolution of the problem. Although no legal
obligation compels the media to honor the pledge, a weighty moral
duty does exist. Should the networks breach that duty, they will not
only invite denunciations from citizens and Congress, but they will
also fuel the growing cries for greater restrictions on first amendment
freedoms. That these angry voices could someday prevail should give
the media pause.
(stating in dictum that congressional power extends to "supervision of voting, protection of
voters, [and] prevention of fraud and corrupt practices").
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